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Abstract
There are important concerns when trusting sensitive information to the cloud. Health and ﬁnancial records, for instance, suﬀer
strict legal restrictions to data escrow. Organizations holding such information need to assure end-users and authorities that a
third party will never access restricted data. Client-side encryption is a common solution in literature. Most works fail, however,
to reason the impact of security solutions on performance and usability. Homomorphic and order preserving encryption systems
can mitigate such negative impacts, as they allow the computation of regular searches over encrypted records on the cloud, while
preserving information conﬁdentiality and the privacy if end-users.
c© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
Cloud computing is a business model by which pooled computational resources are provisioned, on demand and
with rapid elasticity, through a broadband network, in the form of a metered service1. The main economic appeal of
such services is that consumers are able to turn huge capital costs into a smaller and more ﬂexible operational defrayal,
pushing concerns with ownership and maintenance of the underlying infrastructure supporting their computing and
communication systems to the service provider2.
To reason the security of assets on the cloud, one must select a stakeholders’ perspective or needs. Providers need
to eﬃciently charge for any access to cloud resources. Consumers need assurances about the control over their assets,
stability of services and predictability in business conditions. End-users need privacy; they need accurate information
and a good sense of control on who has access to their private information3. No realistic security solution can be
designed to respond to all needs at once.
Also, there are diﬀerent service models and contract options that render diﬀerent levels of control and responsibility
over systems security to cloud consumers and providers. Infrastructure-as-a-Service consumers control VMs (virtual
machines), operational systems, libraries and network conﬁguration, and, thus, are able to implement sophisticated
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security techniques, such as VM nesting, memory and processes taint analysis4. The same is not true to Platform-as-
a-Service or Software-as-a-Service consumers.
There is an important trade-oﬀ here: the higher the complexity of cloud services, the lesser the ﬂexibility and eﬀec-
tive control over the assets for the consumer and, therefore, the greater the importance of the provider in information
security. In most cases, the provider, as a larger organization, with access to cutting edge technology and highly qual-
iﬁed personnel, will be in a better position to deal with security. Consumers, therefore, are better oﬀ pushing security
concerns and costs to the provider. In some cases, however, consumers are bound by law to guarantee themselves the
integrity, conﬁdentiality and privacy of information they hold.
Health care providers, for instance, are held responsible for the security of health records and their patient’s privacy.
That is, records under their guard cannot be disclosed to any third parties, and, in the case that they are, cannot be used
to identify a person. Such restrictions do not only apply to those records comprising health information, but also those
that reveal the payment for the provision of any kind of health services. A hospital manager cannot simply respond to
government oﬃcials saying that the cloud provider is HIPAAa compliant and, therefore, he could share the escrow of
the Electronic Health Records under his responsibility. The credit card operator, in the same way, cannot share a card
holder’s payment history on the grounds that the provider is PCIb compliant.
The provider will always have privileged access to every part of his service infrastructure, and a curious provider
could misuse the virtualization and provisioning basic software stack to capitalize on eventual access to consumer
data. The ‘2015 Information Security Breaches Survey’5, a comprehensive study from the UK’s government, shows
that 75% of large corporations in the country had security events related to internal personnel in that year. Despite
the solid security and audit processes usually in place, large cloud providers are still vulnerable to the ‘insider threat’,
thus cloud consumers are always at risk of leakage of data transported, processed or stored on the cloud.
Hence, with little control over environment conﬁguration and the resulting security of processes, and little or no
access to credible auditing tools, the average consumer can only control what is delivered to the cloud. That makes
client-side encryption an important topic. The intuition is that, if every piece of data is encrypted at client-side in
a way that even an attacker with enormous computing power cannot break information conﬁdentiality, or end-user’s
privacy, then the use of a cloud service does not impact information escrow policies6.
For simple reading and writing to the cloud, the best ﬁt is a fast, well tested and standardized symmetric encryption
system. Along with the system used for storage, homomorphic and OPE (order-preserving encryption) systems can
be used to provide search indexes and anonymous aggregate information – such as modes, means and other measures
of central tendency. A careful combination of diﬀerent schemes, each enabling a speciﬁc computation or feature, can
be used to perform regular searches and the most commonly needed operations over the encrypted data on the cloud,
revealing no relevant information to an eventual eavesdropper.
2. Related work
There is an intense work, both in industry and academia, to formulate practical solutions with reasonable security
for cloud applications. Some works present ways to enhance the auditability of the cloud service software7. The
strongest trend, however, is to assume the cloud is unsafe and propose a form of secure delegation of computation.
Secure multi-party computation protocols have been around for over thirty years now: some with provable security
in the semi-honest setting, which ﬁts the cloud scenario. Nevertheless, there are still very few eﬃcient and broadly
applicable implementations8.
Client-side encryption, using homomorphic cryptography, may represent a simpler alternative. The non-interactive
nature of homomorphic encryption solutions results in more eﬃcient systems, not bound by network latency nor by
the client’s thin hardware. Also, there are already many practical applications in literature. The system of Chase and
Lauter, for instance, uses an anonymous credentials system, in the form of cryptographic tokens, to allow the exchange
of data or endorsement messages between diﬀerent agents in the health care industry, disclosing no information other
than the strictly necessary for that single interaction9.
a Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, a US law enforcing standards for electronic health record transactions
b Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard, a information security standard for credit cards and payment accounts
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Bos et al use homomorphic encryption schemes for the execution of machine learning algorithms over encrypted
records on the cloud. Their system uses a previously built classiﬁcation model to process new encrypted observations
sent to the cloud server10. The classiﬁer yields an encrypted result that can only be decrypted at the client that
generated the query. Lauter and co-workers showed many examples of statistical and learning algorithms running
over encrypted data on the cloud11.
Those are very specialized applications, running complex algorithms and using complex homomorphic encryption
schemes and protocols. The average consumer, however, needs simpler tools, leveraging industry level cryptographic
libraries or, at most, implementing simpler cryptosystems. This orientation, towards solutions for common web
application features, is the intuition behind works such as CryptDB and Mylar12,13.
CryptDB is an extension to the MySQL client connector that allows the transformation of regular SQL queries
so that they can run on encrypted databases. While it is a very innovative and practical solution, it still requires the
consumer to run the web application on a trusted server, outsourcing only the database to the cloud. Mylar is an
extension to Meteor (a web and mobile applications framework) that brings encryption functions to the client-side.
It features a multi-key searchable encryption scheme that enables private communication and keyword search for
end-users, while cloud servers receive only encrypted data.
Searchable or pattern matching encryption very well suites an array of small to mid-sized applications: messaging,
chats, task lists, among others14. Most corporate systems, nonetheless, deal with structured and numerical data. In
such cases, range queries, modes, means, averages and simple arithmetic operations are constantly computed over
large portions of the database – at the server side.
3. Homomorphic encryption at client-side
There are many partially or somewhat homomorphic encryption systems that enable such computations. The Pail-
lier system and Benaloh’s DPE (Dense Probabilistic Encryption) schemes provide additively-homomorphic operations
over the ciphertexts15,16. ElGamal and unpadded RSA schemes allow multiplication. The somewhat homomorphic
system of Boneh, Goh and Nissim allows one multiplication and many additions17. The system of Naehrig, Lauter
and Vaikuntanathan, based on a LWE (Learning With Error) primitive, allows a limited number of both additions and
multiplications18.
OPE schemes provide indexes for range queries and comparisons among encrypted values. These schemes are
designed to leak some information on the encrypted values. The proportion of bits revealed usually varies with the cost
of encryption. The system of Boldyreva at al, for instance, is very fast and has many open-source implementations
available, but is known to leak even the order of magnitude of encrypted values – depending on the number of
plaintexts encrypted with the same key, their range and dispersion19. The OPE protocol of Popa et al leaks no
information besides the order of queries to the database, but, for every new encryption, requires a number of accesses
to the server logarithmic in the number of previously encrypted values – with each access followed by one AES
decryption20.
There is a clear use case for homomorphic and order-preserving systems in Electronic Health Records: an OPE
scheme can be used to provide indexes to the types of observations (e.g. body measurements, medicine prescriptions,
exams, diseases) in each record and to provide range queries over the magnitudes of such observations. That allows a
doctor to use the computing power of the cloud to select records of interest in the daily use of the EHR system. It also
allows a researcher to safely compute modes and a few statistical tests over the encrypted records on the cloud. An
additively homomorphic system can be used to compute means over the encrypted values, while preserving patients
privacy and the conﬁdentiality requirements of health data21. The Paillier system, for example, has been used as a
building block of a protocol proven to be eﬃcient in the computation of ridge regression over hundreds of millions of
records on the cloud22.
The right choice for any cloud application is really a matter of matching functional requirements and the operations
provided by each cryptosystem. Now, when designing a cloud application, the consumer must evaluate the nature of
data that will be stored and processed on the cloud. The consumer needs a clear discernment of the relationship
between the assets to be protected and technically feasible and economically relevant threats in order to evaluate what
kind of impacts a security breach may bring to end-users and the business.
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If client-side encryption emerges from this process as a business requirement, then the engineers designing the
application must assess the minimum set of computations required to be performed on the cloud, and select crypto-
graphic primitives that will enable such computations under acceptable security parameters. One may argue that this
kind of understanding and familiarity with diﬀerent cryptographic schemes is not a common skill among average pro-
fessionals. But the evolution of cloud computing security, both in terms of academic knowledge and industry-ready
products diversiﬁcation and maturation, will eventually bring about this culture. The same happened to the encryption
and digital signature primitives wildly adopted in industry nowadays.
4. Conclusion
Client-side encryption with homomorphic systems does not constitute a ‘one-size-ﬁts-all’ type of solution. Nev-
ertheless, given the inherited risks of cloud services and the existence of special use cases, as the ones previously
mentioned, where the only way to outsource computing power is to have all data encrypted beforehand, it is possible
to state that the way ahead in cloud security certainly incorporates related techniques. Therefore, there remains a clear
need for the development, consistent trying and wide application of simple and eﬃcient homomorphic cryptographic
primitives, as well as the need for the development of open and free software projects with carefully curated libraries
of cryptographic functions derived from such primitives.
There are many examples of successful and well established projects, such as OpenSSL, GnuCrypto, BouncyCastle
and LibTomCrypt – to name a few – that had a great impact on the dissemination and use of cryptographic primitives
on day-to-day computing. Libraries, API’s, and frameworks, such as Mylar, can bridge the gap, bringing strong
cryptographic functions to common programmers and improving the overall quality of software projects. That would
greatly contribute to the advancement of security and privacy in the cloud computing scenario.
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